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Abstract
E. Bach, following an idea of T. Itoh, has shown how to build a small
set of numbers modulo a prime p such that at least one element of this set
is a generator of Z/pZ. E. Bach suggests also that at least half of his set
should be generators. We show here that a slight variant of this set can in-
deed be made to contain a ratio of primitive roots as close to 1 as necessary.
In particular we present an asymptotically O∼
“q
1
ǫ
log1.5(p) + log2(p)
”
algorithm providing primitive roots of p with probability of correctness
greater than 1 − ǫ and several O(logα(p)), α ≤ 5.23, algorithms comput-
ing ”Industrial-strength” primitive roots.
1 Introduction
Primitive roots are generators of the multiplicative group of the invertibles of a
finite field. We focus in this paper only on prime finite fields, but the proposed
algorithms can work over extension fields or other multiplicative groups.
Primitive roots are of intrinsic use e.g. for secret key exchange (Diffie-
Hellman), pseudo random generators (Blum-Micali) or primality certification.
The classical method of generation of such generators is by trial, test and
error. Indeed within a prime field with p elements they are quite numerous
(φ(φ(p)) = φ(p− 1) among p− 1 invertibles are generators.
The problem resides in the test to decide whether a number g is a generator
or not. The first idea is to test every gi for i = 1..p − 1 looking for matches.
Unfortunately this is exponential in the size of p. An acceleration is then to
factor p− 1 and test whether one of the g p−1q is 1 for q a divisor of p− 1. If this
is the case then g is obviously not a generator. On the contrary, one has proved
that the only possible order of g is p− 1. Unfortunately again, factorization is
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still not a polynomial time process: no polynomial time algorithm computing
primitive roots is known.
However, there exists polynomial time methods isolating a polynomial size
set of numbers containing at least one primitive root. Shoup’s [24] algorithm
is such a method. Elliot and Murata [9] also gave polynomial lower bounds on
the least primitive root modulo p. One can also generate elements with expo-
nentially large order even though not being primitive roots [13]. Our method is
in between those two approaches.
As reported by Bach [2], Itoh’s breakthrough was to use only a partial fac-
torization of p − 1 to produce primitive roots with high probability [15]. Bach
then used this idea of partial factorization to give the actually smallest known
set, deterministically containing one primitive root[2], if the Extended Riemann
Hypothesis is true. Moreover, he suggested that his set contained at least half
primitive roots.
In this paper, we propose to use a combination of Itoh’s and Bach’s algo-
rithms producing a polynomial time algorithm generating primitive roots with
a very small probability of failure (without the ERH). Such generated numbers
will be denoted by “Industrial-strength” primitive roots. We also have a guar-
anteed lower bound on the order of the produced elements. In this paper, we
analyze the actual ratio of primitive roots within a variant of Bach’s full set.
As this ratio is close to 1, both in theory and even more in practice, selecting a
random element within this set produces a fast and effective method computing
primitive roots.
We present in section 2 our algorithm and the main theorem counting this
ratio. Then practical implementation details and effective ratios are discussed
section 4. We conclude section 6 with applications of primitive root generation,
accelerated by our probabilistic method. Among this applications are Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, ElGamal cryptosystem, Blum-Micali pseudo random bit
generation, and a new probabilistic primality test based on Lucas’ determin-
istic procedure. This test uses both the analysis of the first sections and the
composite case.
2 The variant of Itoh/Bach’s algorithm
The salient features of our approach when compared to Bach’s are that:
1. We partially factor, but with known lower bound on the remaining factors.
2. We do not require the primality of the chosen elements.
3. Random elements are drawn from the whole set of candidates instead of
only from the first ones.
Now, when compared to Itoh’s method, we use a deterministic process producing
a number with a very high order and which has a high probability of being
primitive. On the contrary, Itoh selects a random element but uses a polynomial
process to prove that this number is a primitive root with high probability [15].
The difference here is that we use low order terms to build higher order elements
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Algorithm 1: Probabilistic Primitive Root
Input: A prime p ≥ 3 and a failure probability 0 < ǫ < 1.
Output: A number, primitive root with probability greater than 1− ε.
begin
Compute B such that (1 + 2
p−1 )(1 − 1B )logB
p−1
2 = 1− ε.
Partially factor p− 1 = 2e1pe22 .....pehh Q (pi < B and Q has no factor
< B).
for each 1 ≤ i ≤ h do
By trial and error, randomly choose αi verifying:
α
p−1
pi
i 6≡ 1 (mod p).
Set a ≡
h∏
i=1
α
p−1
p
ei
i
i (mod p).
if Factorization is complete then
Set Probability of correctness to 1 and return a.
else
Refine Probability of correctness to (1 + 1
Q−1 )(1− 1B )logB Q.
Randomly choose b verifying: b
p−1
Q 6≡ 1 and return
g ≡ ab p−1Q (mod p).
end
whereas Itoh discards the randomly chosen candidates and restarts all over at
each failure. Therefore we first compute the ratio of primitive roots within the
set. We have found afterwards that Itoh, independently and differently, proves
quite the same within his [15, Theorem 1].
Theorem 1 At least φ(Q)
Q−1 of the returned values of Algorithm 1 are primitive
roots.
Proof. We let p − 1 = kQ. In algorithm 1, the order of a is (p − 1)/Q = k
(see [2]). We partition Z/pZ
∗
by S and T where
S = {b ∈ Z/pZ∗ : bk 6≡ 1(mod p)} and T = {b ∈ Z/pZ∗ : bk ≡ 1(mod p)}
and let U = {b ∈ Z/pZ∗ : bk has order Q}. Note that for any x ∈ Z/pZ∗ of
order n and any y ∈ Z/pZ∗ of order m, if gcd(n,m) = 1 then the order of
z ≡ xy(mod p) is nm. Thus for any b ∈ U it follows that g ≡ abk(mod p) has
order p− 1. Since U ⊆ S, we have that |U||S| of the returned values of algorithm
1 are primitive roots.
We thus now count the number of elements of U and S. On the one hand,
we fix arbitrarily a primitive root g˜ ∈ Z/pZ∗ and define E = {i : 0 ≤ i ≤
Q and gcd(i, Q) = 1}. |E| = ϕ(Q) and it is not difficult to see that U =
{g˜i+jQ : i ∈ E and 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1}. This implies that |U | = kϕ(Q).
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On the other hand, we have T = {g˜0, g˜Q, . . . , g˜(k−1)Q}. The partitioning
therefore gives |S| = |Z/pZ∗| − |T | = p − 1 − k. We thus conclude that |U||S| =
kφ(Q)
p−1−k =
φ(Q)
Q−1 . 
Corollary 2 Algorithm 1 is correct and, when Pollard’s rho algorithm is used,
has an average running time of O
(√
1
ε
log2.5(p) + log3(p) log(log(p))
)
∗.
Proof. We first need to show that φ(Q)
Q−1 > 1 − ε. Let Q =
ω(Q)∏
i=1
qi
fi where
ω(Q) is the number of distinct prime factors of Q. Then φ(Q) =
ω(Q)∏
i=1
φ(qi
fi) =
Q
ω(Q)∏
i=1
(1 − 1
qi
). Thus φ(Q)
Q−1 = (1 +
1
Q−1 )
ω(Q)∏
i=1
(1 − 1
qi
). Now, since any factor of
Q is bigger than B, we have:
ω(Q)∏
i=1
(1 − 1
qi
) >
ω(Q)∏
i=1
(1 − 1
B
) = (1 − 1
B
)ω(Q). To
conclude, we minor ω(Q) by logB(Q). This gives the probability refinement
†.
Since Q is not known at the beginning, one can minor it there by p−12 since p−1
must be even whenever p ≥ 3. Now for the complexity. For the computation of
B, we use a Newton-Raphson’s approximation. The second step depends on the
factorization method. Both complexities here are given by the application of
Pollard’s rho algorithm. Indeed Pollard’s rho would require at worst L = 2⌈B⌉
loops and L = O(
√
B) on the average thanks to the birthday paradox. Now
each loop of Pollard’s rho is a squaring and a gcd, both of complexity O(log2 p).
Then we need to bound B with respect to ε. We let h = (p − 1)/2 and
B∗ = min{ln(h)/ε;h} and consider fh(ε) = (1− 1/B∗)logB∗ (h) − (1− ε). Then
fh(ε) =
„
1−
1
ln(B∗)
«
ε+
1
2ln(B∗)
„
1
ln(B∗)
−
1
ln(h)
«
ε2 +O
„
ε3
6ln(B∗)3
«
is strictly positive as soon asB∗ ≥ 3. This proves that 1−ε < (1−1/B∗)logB∗ (h).
Now, since (1 − 1/B)logB(h) is decreasing in B, this shows that B such that
(1 + 2
p−1 )(1 − 1B )logB
p−1
2 = 1− ε satisfies B < B∗ ≤ ln(h)
ε
.
For the remaining steps, there is at worst log p distinct factors, thus log p dis-
tinct αi, but only log log p on the average [14, Theorem 430]. Each one requires
a modular exponentiation which can be performed with O(log3 p) operations
using recursive squaring. Now, to get a correct αi, at most O(log log p) trials
should be necessary (see e.g. [25, Theorem 6.18]). However, by an argument
similar to that of theorem 1, less than 1− 1
pi
of the αi are such that α
p−1
pi
i ≡ 1.
This gives an average number of trials of 1+ 1
pi
, which is bounded by a constant.
∗Using fast integer arithmetic this can become :
O
“q
1
ε
log1.5(p) log2(log(p)) log(log(log(p)))+ log2(p) log2(log(p)) log(log(log(p)))
´
; but the
worst case complexity is O
`
1
ε
log3(p) + log4(p) log(log(p))
´
.
†Note that one can dynamically refine B as more factors of p − 1 are known.
4
This gives log× log3× log log in the worst case (distinct factors × exponentia-
tion × number of trials) and only log log× log3×2 on the average. 
3 About the number of prime divisors
In the previous section, we have seen that the probability to get a primitive root
out of our algorithm is greater than
(
1− 1
B
)ω(Q)
for Q the remaining unfactored
part with no divisors less than B. The running time of the algorithm, and in
particular its non-polynomial behavior depends on B and on ω. In practice, ω is
quite small in general. The problem is that the bound we used in the preceding
section, logB(p − 1), is then much too large. In this section, we thus provide
tighter probability estimates for some small B and large Q.
Theorem 3 Let B ∈ IN, Q ∈ IN such that no prime lower than B divides Q
then:
ω(Q) ≤ logB(Q) ∀B ≥ 2 (1)
ω(Q) ≤ 1.0956448
logB(ln(Q))
logB(Q) ∀B ≥ 210 (2)
ω(Q) ≤ 1.0808280
logB(ln(Q))
logB(Q) ∀B ≥ 215 (3)
ω(Q) ≤ 1.0561364
logB(ln(Q))
logB(Q) ∀B ≥ 220 (4)
Proof. Of course, (1) is a large upper bound on the number of divisors of
Q and therefore a bound on the number of prime divisors. Now for the other
bounds, we refine Robin’s bound on ω [23, Theorem 11]: which is ω(n) ≤
1.3841
ln(ln(n)) ln(n). Let Nk =
∏k
i=1 pi where pi is the i-th prime. Now, we let k
be such that Nk
Npi(B)
≤ Q < Nk+1
Npi(B)
. Then ω(Q) ≤ ω
(
Nk
Npi(B)
)
= k − π(B) since
no prime less than B can divide Q. We then combine this with the fact that
X →֒ ln(X)
X
is decreasing for (X > e), to get: ω(Q) ≤ F (k,B)logB(ln(Q)) logB(Q) where
F (k,B) =
(k−π(B)) log
„
log
„
Nk
Npi(B)
««
log
„
Nk
Npi(B)
« . We then replace both Nk in F (k,B) using
e.g. classical bounds on θ(pk) = ln(Nk) [23, Theorems 7 & 8]:
θ(pk) ≥k
(
ln k + ln ln k − 1 + ln ln k − 2.1454
ln k
)
(5)
θ(pk) ≤k
(
ln k + ln ln k − 1 + ln ln k − 1.9185
ln k
)
(6)
We therefore obtain a function F˜ (k,B) explicit in k and B. The values given
in the theorem are the numerically computed maximal values of F˜ (k,B) as a
5
function of k for B ∈ {210, 215, 220}. The claim then follows from the fact that
F˜ (k,B) is decreasing in B. 
It is noticeable that the last estimates are more interesting than logB(Q) only
when B
eF (k,B) < ln(Q). Those estimates are then only useful for very large Q
(e.g. more than 105 bits for B = 215).
4 Industrial-strength primitive roots
Of course, the only problem with this algorithm is that it is not polynomial.
Indeed the partial factorization up to factors of any given size is still exponen-
tial. This gives the non polynomial factor
√
1
ε
. Other factoring algorithms with
better complexity could also be used, provided they can guarantee a bound on
the unfound factors. For that reason, we propose another algorithm with an at-
tainable number of loops for the partial factorization. Therefore, the algorithm
is efficient and we provide experimental data showing that it also has a very
good behavior with respect to the probabilities:
Heuristic 2: Apply Algorithm 1 with B ≤ log2(p) log2(log(p)).
With Pollard’s rho factoring, the algorithm has now an average bit polynomial
complexity of : O
(
log3(p) log(log(p))
)
(just replace B by log2(p) log2(log(p))
and use L =
√
B). In practice, L could be chosen not higher than a million:
in figures 1 we choose Q with known factorization and compute φ(Q)
Q−1 ; the
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φ(Q
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Figure 1: Actual probability of failure of Algorithm 1 with L = 220
experimental data then shows that in practice no probability less than 1− 2−40
6
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φ(Q
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Q−
1))
Number of bits of Q
500 factors
400 factors
300 factors
200 factors
100 factors
Figure 2: Actual probability of failure for Q with many distinct factors
is possible even with L as small as 220.
Provided that one is ready to accept a fixed probability, further improvements
on the asymptotic complexity can be made. Indeed, D. Knuth said ”For the
probability less than (14 )
25 that such a 25-times-in-row procedures gives the wrong
information about n. It’s much more likely that our computer has dropped a bit
in its calculations, due to hardware malfunctions or cosmic radiations, than that
algorithm P has repeatedly guessed wrong.”‡ We thus provide a version of our
algorithm guaranteeing that the probability of incorrect answer is lower than
2−40:
Algorithm 3: If p is small (p < 45171967), factor p− 1 completely, otherwise
apply Algorithm 1 with B = log5.298514p.
With Pollard’s rho factoring, the average asymptotic bit complexity is then
O(log4.649257 p): Factoring numbers lower than 45171967, takes constant time.
Now for larger primes and B = logα(p), we just remark that (1 + 2
p−1 )(1 −
1
B
)logB
p−1
2 is increasing in p, so that it is bounded by its first value. Numerical
approximation of α so that the latter is 1− 2−40 gives 5.298514. The complex-
ity exponent follows as it is 2 + α2 . One can also apply the same arguments
e.g. for a probability 1− 2−55 and factoring all primes p < 2512 (since 513-bit
numbers are nowadays factorizable), then slightly degrading the complexity to
O(log5.229921p). We have thus proved that a probability of at least 1− 2−40 can
always be guaranteed. In other words, our algorithm is able to efficiently pro-
duce “industrial-strength” primitive roots. This is for instance illustrated when
‡ More precisely, cosmic rays only can be responsible for 105 software errors in 109 chip-
hours at sea level[20] . At 1GHz, this makes 1 error every 255 computations.
7
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 256  512  1024  2048  4096  8192
Prime size
Time (s)
GAP
Maple
Magma
PARI−GP
Heuristic 2 (1−2−40)
Algorithm 3 (1−2−40) ; (1−2−55)
Figure 3: Generations of primitive roots
comparing our algorithm, implemented in C++ with GMP, to existing software
(Maple 9.5, Pari-GP, GAP 4r4 and Magma 2.11)§ on an Intel PIV 2.4GHz. This
comparison is shown on figure 3. Of course, the comparison is not fair as other
softwares are always factoring p− 1 completely. Still we can see the progress in
primitive root generation that our algorithm has enabled.
5 Analysis of the algorithm for composite num-
bers
In this section we propose an analysis of the behavior of the algorithm for
composite numbers. Indeed, our algorithm can also be used to produce high,
if not maximal, order element modulo a composite number. This analysis is
also used section 6.2 for the probabilistic primality test. It is well known that
there exists primitive roots for every number of the form 2, 4, pk or 2pk with p
an odd prime. On the other hand, Euler’s theorem states that every invertible
a ∈ Z/pZ∗ satisfies aϕ(n) ≡ 1[n]. Thus, for composite numbers n not possessing
primitive roots, ϕ(n) is not a possible order of an invertible. We therefore
use λ(m), Carmichael’s lambda function, the maximal order of an invertible
element in the multiplicative group (Z/pZ
∗, ×). See e.g. [16, 10, 3], for more
details. Of course, λ and ϕ coincide for 2, 4, pk and 2pk, for p and odd prime.
§swox.com/gmp, maplesoft.com, pari.math.u-bordeaux.fr, gap-system.org,
magma.maths.usyd.edu.au
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Then λ(2e) = 2e−2 for e ≥ 3. Now, for the other cases, since ϕ
(∏
pkii
)
=∏
(pi − 1)pki−1i for distinct primes pi, we obtain this similar formula for λ:
λ
(∏
pkii
)
= lcm{λ(pkii )}. Eventually, we also obtain this corollary of Euler’s
theorem:
Corollary 4 Every invertible a within Z/pZ
∗ satisfies aλ(n) ≡ 1[n].
Proof. n =
∏
peii for distinct primes pi. Then ϕ(p
ei
i ) divides λ(n). This,
together with Euler’s theorem shows that aλ(n) ≡ 1[peii ]. The Chinese theorem
thus implies that the latter is also true modulo the product of the peii . 
This corollary shows that the order of any invertible must divide λ(n). For n
prime, the number of invertibles having order d|n − 1 is exactly ϕ(d) so that∑
d|k ϕ(d) = k for k|n − 1. We have the following analogue for n a composite
number:
Proposition 5 The number of invertibles having order d|λ(n) is∑Sd∏ωj=1 ϕ(dj)
for n = pe11 . . . p
eω
ω and Sd = {(d1, . . . , dω) s.t. dj |ϕ(pejj ) and lcm{dj} = d}.
Proof. By the Chinese theorem, an element has order d if and only if the lcm
of its orders modulo the p
ej
j is d. Then there are exactly ϕ(dj) elements of order
dj modulo p
ej
j . 
Let us have a look of this behavior on an example: let n = 45 so that
ϕ(45) = 6 × 4 = 24 and λ(45) = 12. We thus know that any order modulo 9
divides ϕ(9) = 6 and that any order modulo 5 divides ϕ(5) = 4. This gives
the different orders of the 24 invertibles shown on table 1. It would be highly
desirable to have tight bounds on those number of elements of a given order.
Moreover, these bounds should be easily computable (e.g. not requiring some
factorization !). In [5, 19], the following is proposed:
Proposition 6 [5, Corollary 6.8] For n odd, the number of elements of order
λ(n) (primitive λ−roots) is larger than ϕ(ϕ(n)).
Now, this last result shows that actually quite a lot of elements are of maximal
order modulo n. Using this fact, a modification of algorithm 1 can then produce
with high probability an element of maximal order even though n is composite.
6 Applications
Of course, our generation can be applied to any application requiring the use of
primitive roots. In this section we show the speed of our method compared to
generation of primes with known factorization and propose a generalization of
Miller-Rabin probabilistic primality test and of Davenport’s strengthenings [7].
9
order # of elements of that
modulo 45 modulo 9 modulo 5 order modulo 45
1 1 1 1
1 2 1
2 1 1
2 2 1
2 3
3 3 1 ϕ(3) × ϕ(1) = 2
1 4 ϕ(1) × ϕ(4) = 2
2 4 ϕ(2) × ϕ(4) = 2
4 4
6 1 ϕ(6) × ϕ(1) = 2
3 2 ϕ(3) × ϕ(2) = 2
6 2 ϕ(6) × ϕ(2) = 2
6 6
3 4 ϕ(3) × ϕ(4) = 4
6 4 ϕ(6) × ϕ(4) = 4
12 8
Table 1: Elements of a given order modulo 45
6.1 Faster pseudo random generators construction or key
exchange
The use of a generator and a big prime is the core of many cryptographic
protocols. Among them are Blum-Micali pseudo-random generators [4], Diffie-
Hellman key exchange [8], etc.
In this section we just compare the generation of primes with known factoriza-
tion [1], so that primitive roots of primes with any given size are computable.
The idea in [4] is to iteratively and randomly build primes so that the factoriza-
tions of pi−1 are known. For cryptanalysis reasons their original method selects
the primes and primitive roots bit by bit and is therefore quite slow. On figure
4 we then present also a third way, which is to generate the prime with known
factorization as in [1], but then to generate the primitive root deterministically
with our algorithm (since the factorization of p− 1 is known). We compare this
method with the following full-probabilistic way:
1. By trial and error generate a probable prime (e.g. a prime passing several
Miller-Rabin tests [18]).
2. Generate a probable primitive root by Heuristic 2.
We see on figure 4 that our method is faster and allows for the use of bigger
primes/generators.
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Figure 4: Blum-Micali primes with known factorization vs Industrial-strength
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6.2 Probabilistic Lucas primality test
The deterministic primality test of Lucas is actually the existence of primitive
roots:
Theorem 7 (Lucas) Let p > 0. If one can find an a > 0 such that ap−1 ≡
1mod p and a
p−1
q 6≡ 1mod p, as soon as q divides p− 1, then p is prime.
We propose here as a probabilistic primality test to try to build a primitive root.
If one succeeds then the number is prime with high probability else it is either
proven composite or composite with a high probability.
Now for the complexity, we do not pretend to challenge Miller-Rabin test for
speed ! Well, one often needs to perform several Miller-Rabin tests with distinct
witnesses, so that the probability of being prime increases. Our idea is the
following: since one tests several witnesses, why not use them as factors of our
probable primitive root ! This idea can then be viewed as a generalization of
Miller-Rabin: we not only test for orders of the form n−12e but also for each order
of the form n−1
qe
where q is a small prime factor of n−1. The effective complexity
(save maybe from the partial factorization) will not suffer and the probability
11
can jump as soon as an element with very high order is generated. The algorithm
is then a slight modification of algorithm 1, where we let F (B,Q) = 1 − (1 +
1
Q−1 )(1− 1B )logB Q:
Algorithm 2: Probabilistic Lucas primality test
Input: n ≥ 3, odd.
Input: A failure probability 0 < ǫ < 1.
Output: Whether n is prime and a certificate of primality,
Output: or n is composite and a factor (or just a Fermat witness),
Output: or n is prime with probability of error less than ǫ,
Output: or n is composite with probability of error less than ǫ.
begin
Set P = 1, a = 1, Q = n− 1 and q = 2.
while Q > n
2
3 do
Randomly choose α mod n.
if gcd(α, n) 6= 1 or gcd(αn−1q − 1, n) /∈ {1;n} or αn−1 6≡ 1[n] or
(q == 2 and n is not a strong pseudoprime to the base α) then
return n is composite.
else if α
n−1
q ≡ 1 mod n then
Set P = P/q.
if P ≤ ǫ then
return n is probably composite with error less than P .
else
- Set e to the greatest power of q dividing Q.
- Set Q = Q/qe.
- Set a = a× αn−1qe .
- Set k = k ∪ {qe}.
- Refine B such that F (B,Q) == 4ǫ.
- Find a new prime factor q of Q with q < B, otherwise set
q = Q.
if Every q was prime then
return n is prime and (a, k) is a certificate.
else
return n is probably prime with error less than F (B, q).
end
Remark 8 The exponentiations by n−1
q
can in practice be factorized in a “Lucas-
tree” [22, 6].
Remark 9 Algorithm 2 is correct for the primes and most of the composite
numbers.
Proof. Correctness for prime numbers is the correctness of the pseudo primi-
tive root generation.
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Now for composite numbers: the idea is that first of all, only Carmichael num-
bers will be able to pass the pseudo prime test several times.
The 4ǫ then follows since at least one α passed the strong pseudoprime test.
This reduces the possible Carmichael numbers able to pass our test. Then, for
most of the Carmichael numbers, λ(n) divides n − 1 but, moreover, λ(n) also
divides n−1
q
for some q, factor of n− 1. Therefore, αn−1q will always be one. If
n is prime on the contrary, only 1
q
elements will have order a multiple of q.
Now for the n
2
3 in the loop. The argument is the same as for the Pocklington
theorem [6, Theorem 4.1.4] and the Brillhart, Lehmer and Selfridge theorem [6,
Theorem 4.1.5]: let n− 1 = kQ and let p be a prime factor of n. The algorithm
has found an a verifying an−1 ≡ 1 mod n. Hence, the order of aQ mod p is a
divisor of n−1
Q
= k. Now, since gcd(a
n−1
q − 1, n) = 1 for each prime q dividing
k, this order is not a proper divisor of k, so is equal to k. Hence, k must be a
divisor of p − 1 = ϕ(p). We conclude that each prime factor of n must exceed
k. From this, Pocklington’s theorem states that if k is greater than
√
n, n is
prime. And then, Brillhart-Lehmer-Selfridge theorem states that if k is in be-
tween n
1
3 and n
1
2 then n must be prime or composite with exactly two prime
factors [6, Theorem 4.1.5]. But n has escaped our previous tests only if n is
a Carmichael number. Fortunately, Carmichael numbers must have at least 3
factors [17, Proposition V.1.3]. Now, whenever Q is below n
2
3 , k exceeds n
1
3
and then n must be prime otherwise n would have more than 3 factors each of
those being greater than n
1
3 . 
Here is an example of Carmichael number, 1729. 1728 = 2633, where
λ(1729) = 2232. Then n−1
q
is either 864 or 576 both of which are divisible
by 36 = λ(1729). Therefore, our test will detect 1729 to be probably compos-
ite with any probability of correctness. Figure 5 shows that this algorithm is
highly competitive with repeated applications of GMP’s strong pseudo prime
test (i.e. with the same estimated probability of correctness). Depending on
the success of the partial factorization, our test can even be faster (timing, on a
PIV 2.4GHz, presented on figure 5 are the mean time between 4 distinct runs).
Haplessly, some Carmichael numbers will still pass our test. The following
results, sharpening [11, lemma 1], explains why:
Theorem 10 Let n = pe11 . . . p
eω
ω . Let q be a prime divisor of ϕ(n), and
(f1, . . . , fω) be the maximal values for which q
fi divides ϕ(peii ). There are
ϕ(n)
(
1− 1
q
P
fi
)
invertible elements of order divisible by q (i.e. for which α
λ(n)
q 6≡ 1 mod n).
Proof. By the Chinese remainder theorem, one can consider the moduli by
peii separately. Suppose, without loss of generality, that p
e1
1 is such that f1 > 0.
Otherwise all the fi are 0 and the theorem is still correct. Consider a generator
g of the invertibles modulo pe11 . An element has q in its order if and only if its
index with respect to g contains qf1 . There are exactly 1 − 1
qf1
such elements
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Figure 5: Probabilistic Lucas vs GMP’s Miller-Rabin for primes with probability
< 10−6
among the elements of Z/pe11 Z. By the Chinese theorem, among the elements
having their order divisible by q modulo n, we have then identified ϕ(n)(1− 1
qf1
)
of them: the ones having their order modulo pe11 divisible by q. Now the others
are among the ϕ(n)( 1
qf1
) that remains. Just now consider those modulo pe22 .
If f2 == 0 then we have not found any new element. Otherwise, 1 − 1qf2 of
them are of order divisible by q. Well, actually, in both cases, we can state that
1 − 1
qf2
of them are of order divisible by q. We have thus found some other
elements: ϕ(n)( 1
qf1
)(1 − 1
qf2
). This added to the previously found elements
makes ϕ(n)(1 − 1
qf1qf2
). Doing such a counting for each of the remaining peii
gives the announced formula. 
For instance, take a Carmichael number still passing our test whenever
B ≤ 1450: 37690903213 = 229× 2243× 73379. Well, 37690903212 = 19× 22×
3×59×1451×1931 and λ(37690903213) = 19×22×3×59×1931. Then, Q will be
1451×1931 and our algorithm will be able to find elements for which αn−1Q 6≡ 1
mod n: those of which order is divisible by 1931. Unfortunately, there are
quite a lot of them: ϕ(n)19301931 = 37489647840≈ (1− .00533962722683134975)n.
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Thus, there are more than 5 chances over a thousand to choose an element α
for which α
n−1
1451×1931 6≡ 1 mod n. Even though this is much higher than 1
Q
(if
n was prime), this probability will not be detected abnormal by our algorithm.
Now, even if p− 1 is seldom smooth for p prime [21], one can wonder if this is
still the case for this special kind of Carmichael numbers . . .
7 Conclusion
We provide here a new very fast and efficient algorithm generating primitive
roots. On the one hand, the algorithm has a polynomial time bit complexity
when all existing algorithms where exponential. This is for instance illustrated
when comparing it to existing software on figure 3. On the other hand, our
algorithm is probabilistic in the sense that the answer might not be a primitive
root. We have seen in this paper however, that the chances that an incorrect
answer is given are less important than say “hardware malfunctions”. For this
reason, we call our answers “Industrial-strength” primitive roots.
Then, we propose a new probabilistic primality test using this primitive root
generation. This test can be viewed as a generalization of Miller-Rabin’s test
to other small prime factors dividing n − 1 The test is then quantifying the
information gained by finding elements of large order modulo n. When a given
probability of correctness is desirable for the test, our algorithm is heuristically
competitive with repeated applications of Miller-Rabin’s.
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